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Political, trade and ﬁnancial integration have been the three deﬁning pillars of the “development
model” of the European transition countries in the past two decades. Until recently, this model
was considered a spectacular success. Since the mid-1990s, the transition region had experienced
an externally ﬁnanced growth spurt, which does not have many parallels in economic history.
However, the disastrous impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on the transition region has cast some
doubt on this model. Several countries suffered double-digit percentage decreases in GDP in
2009. Nevertheless, the beneﬁts of political and trade integration - which are closely linked -
have not seriously been questioned. A reversion of the political integration process is barely
conceivable, and the beneﬁts of trade integration are now widely accepted, both by politicians
and by academics (see, for example, Edwards, 1998).
The criticism focuses instead on ﬁnancial integration. The ﬁnancial crisis was transmitted mainly
through ﬁnancial channels. In addition, ﬁnancial integration seems to have fuelled the credit
boom preceding the ﬁnancial crisis. This credit boom and the related stocks of private foreign
debt are widely believed to have made the transition region so vulnerable to the ﬁnancial crisis,
and are in fact strongly correlated with extent to which output declined in the region during the
crisis (see Bergl¨ of, Korniyenko, Plekhanov, and Zettelmeyer, 2009). The academic literature
is also far less conclusive regarding the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration than it is with respect
to trade integration. In an inﬂuential paper, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) show in a
sample of 65 developing, non-transition countries that current account surpluses had a positive
impact on growth between 1970 and 2004, implying that countries relying on foreign ﬁnancing
grew more slowly than countries relying on domestic savings, which contradicts the neoclassi-
cal view. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) refer to the negative correlation of capital ﬂows and
economic growth in developing countries as the allocation puzzle.
Studies using more disaggregated data tend to draw a somewhat more positive picture of ﬁnancial
integration than country-level studies (see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009b, for an excellent
overview of the literature). When using industry-level data, Prasad et al. (2007) ﬁnd evidence of
threshold effects: ﬁnancial integration appears to have positive growth effects once the ﬁnancial
system is sufﬁciently developed. Moreover, several studies (starting with Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad, 2005) have found evidence of a beneﬁcial effect of ﬁnancial integration through equity
market liberalisation.1 Overall, the picture is still mixed at best, with scant or no evidence to
suggest that ﬁnancial integration supports economic growth in developing countries.
However, as already noted by Prasad et al. (2007), the experience of the European transition re-
gion does not seem to conform to this rather sceptical view of the relationship between ﬁnancial
integration and growth. The combination of large current account deﬁcits and high growth rates
in the years preceding the crisis prima facie suggests that capital inﬂows may have been beneﬁ-
cial for economic growth in these countries. Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano (2004) apply
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology to test for the effect of ﬁnancial development on
economic growth using industry-level data (61 countries over the period 1981-1995, excluding
transition countries) and ﬁrm-level data (ﬁrms from 26 countries, among them 11 transition coun-
1See also De Nicol` o and Juvenal (2010).
1tries, between 1996 and 2001). Their results indicate that ﬁnancial development has a “growth
dividend” in Europe, and they speculate that this will also translate into positive growth effects of
ﬁnancial integration. This view is supported by a recent study by Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009)
who show in a country-level panel regression framework that ﬁnancial integration as measured
by current account deﬁcits had a positive growth effect between 1975 and 2004 in Europe, but
not in the rest of the world.2 Thresholds in institutional quality and ﬁnancial integration itself
can explain only part of the differences between Europe and the rest of the world. Abiad et al.
(2009) argue that the remaining difference may be explained by the reduction in frictions between
intra-EU borders and compare European capital ﬂows to interstate ﬂows within the United States.
Our paper makes two main contributions to this literature. First, we show, using industry-level
data, that ﬁnancial integration has indeed caused higher growth in European transition economies
in the years preceding the current crisis whereas the same is not true for other developing coun-
tries. In contrast to many other papers, our study relies on a sample of developing countries
only and does not include industrialised countries (as in Prasad et al., 2007; Abiad et al., 2009).
A homogeneous sample is preferable because we are interested in explaining the differences in
the growth performance of different developing countries rather than those between developing
and developed countries. Second, we carefully examine the potential reasons for why ﬁnancial
integration was so successful over this time period in the European transition countries. We ﬁrst
test empirically for threshold effects, which have ﬁgured prominently in the academic literature
(for example, Kose, Prasad, and Taylor, 2009c). As threshold variables, we consider ﬁnancial
development, institutional quality, trade integration and ﬁnancial integration itself. The use of a
homogenous sample is critical here: in analyses including both groups of countries, such effects
may be driven by differences between the two country groups rather than by differences within
the group of developing countries. Since threshold effects are not able to explain the observed
differences between emerging Europe and other countries, we ﬁnally analyse the role of political
integration, which so far has hardly been considered in the literature. Political integration with
advanced economies is one of the distinguishing features of European transition countries. We
construct a broad index of political integration on the basis of information on regional integration
agreements, taking into account four dimensions of political integration: institutions, policy coor-
dination, attitudes, and political stability. We then test whether the effect of ﬁnancial integration
is affected by the degree of political integration.
Our analysis suggests that political integration can explain why ﬁnancial integration had such
strong growth effects in European transition economies, but not in other developing countries.
When including political integration in the regression, there is no longer a discernible differ-
ence between emerging Europe and other developing countries. Moreover, within the group of
transition countries, the effect of ﬁnancial integration is strongest for the countries that are most
strongly politically integrated with the EU. This suggests that political and ﬁnancial integration
are complementary and that political integration can considerably increase the beneﬁts of ﬁnan-
cial integration. The reason may be that political integration affects investors’ expectations about
future institutions and policies, which may inﬂuence the way foreign investors employ their cap-
ital in the region in a growth-enhancing way. Hence, ﬁnancial integration may be beneﬁcial for
economic growth even if the current institutional framework is still relatively weak. There are
also some indications that the presence of foreign banks contributed positively to the growth ef-
2Note that the number of observations from transition economies in their sample is rather small.
2fect of ﬁnancial integration. Indeed, the emergence of multinational banking may itself be seen
as a consequence of political integration. Hence, emerging Europe may be different from other
developing countries because ﬁnancial integration was accompanied by corresponding advances
in political integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the stylised fact that emerging Europe
is different. Section 3 puts the recent growth episode of transition economies into perspective
by searching comparable episodes in economic history and discusses the theoretical channels
through which ﬁnancial integration may affect economic growth. Section 4 presents industry-
level evidence showing that emerging Europe was indeed different from other developing coun-
tries in the considered time period. Sections 5 and 6 analyse different candidates that may explain
these differences. Section 5 presents threshold speciﬁcations regarding ﬁnancial development, in-
stitutional quality, trade integration, and ﬁnancial integration itself. Section 6 then focuses on the
role of political integration. Section 7 concludes.
32 The stylised fact
According to standard economic theory, capital ﬂows to developing countries contribute to eco-
nomic growth. Neoclassical theory predicts that capital ﬂows from rich countries with high
capital-labour ratios to poor countries with low capital-labour ratios (and hence a higher marginal
product of capital), increasing capital in the latter countries and thereby contributing to conver-
gence and economic growth. By and large, empirical evidence has not conﬁrmed these predic-
tions (see, for example, Lucas, 1990; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007, and the papers cited in the
introduction). However, basic Stylized facts regarding capital ﬂows to developing countries since
the mid 1990s suggest that there may be differences in the relationship between capital ﬂows and
growth across developing country regions, which are well worth exploring.

























































Chart 1 displays the current account balance as a percentage of GDP for the three main emerging
market regions between 1994 and 2008. All three regions exhibited growth spells during this
period: in the case of European transition countries, since about 1995; in the case of emerging
Asia, since 1999, following the end of the Asian crisis; and in the case of Latin America, since
2003. However, the degree to which the three regions relied on external savings in ﬁnancing these
growth spells is startlingly different. In Asia, the current account adjustment that was prompted
by the crisis (from moderate deﬁcits to a large surplus) failed to revert after the crisis was over;
instead, the region saw a period of rapid growth accompanied by large current account surpluses,
that is, capital exports. Latin America saw a rather similar pattern: a narrowing of the current
account deﬁcit in the crisis period is followed not by a return to deﬁcits during the recovery,
but instead by a further narrowing and a move toward surpluses. Only emerging Europe shows
a completely different pattern: already entering the transition period with substantial current

























































account deﬁcits, emerging Europe experienced a surge in net private capital ﬂows from 2000
onwards, which resulted in persistent and, on average, growing current account deﬁcits. During
the (2006-2008) peak of the boom, these reached double-digit percentage of GDP ratios in several
countries (such as the three Baltic countries, and some countries in south-eastern Europe).3
Hence, while the idea that capital inﬂows are at best neutral and possibly harmful for growth
resonates well with the experience of Latin America and particularly emerging Asia during their
most recent growth spells, this does not seem to be true for the European transition countries.
Consistent with this impression, Chart 2 reveals that the surge of current account deﬁcits in the
transition countries was not driven by a reduction in savings, but rather by a surge in investment to
GDP over the last decade.4 This gives rise to the presumption that foreign capital may have had a
positive effect on the growth performance in European transition countries. The observed combi-
nation of rising investment, high growth performance and a widening current account deﬁcit was
not shared by other regions in this time period (except for a brief widening of the current account
deﬁcit in Latin America just before the crisis, see also Fabrizio, Leigh, and Mody, 2009).5
Lastly, it can be shown that there is indeed a signiﬁcant negative cross-country correlation be-
tween current account balances and real GDP per capita growth rates in emerging Europe. In
3In the following, emerging Europe includes the transition countries in central, eastern and south-eastern
Europe. It does not include states that used to be part of the Soviet Union. In the following, the terms “emerging
Europe” and “European transition countries” are used interchangeably.
4Due to missing country-level data on savings and investment, this chart is based on the regional deﬁnition of
“central and eastern Europe” in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.
5In Section 3, we show, however, that there were comparable episodes in economic history.

































































































































6contrast, this correlation is positive in the overall sample of low- and middle income countries
excluding European transition countries (see charts 3 and 4). Although correlation does not im-
ply causation and a more sophisticated analysis will be needed to verify this conjecture, these
observations raise the question whether emerging Europe is different with respect to the impact
of ﬁnancial integration on economic growth.6
6Note that the same relationship is obtained for the 1998-2005 period, which is used in the regressions.
Moreover, the same stylised fact is also visible in a scatter plot of industry-level growth rates (as used in the
empirical analysis) and ﬁnancial integration. See charts 5 and 6 in the Appendix.
73 Historical parallels
The facts presented in the previous section indicate that the combination of high sustained growth
and large current account deﬁcits is unusual in the developing country experience since the mid
1990s. But is it also unusual in a broad historical perspective? To answer this question, purchas-
ing power-adjusted GDP per capita and current account data were collected for a broad group of
countries from the Americas, the Asia-Paciﬁc region, and Europe from 1850 to 2008. A two-
stage selection was then made: in the ﬁrst stage, all episodes with an average annual growth rate
above 2.5 per cent over a time span between 10 and 20 years - comparable to the recent growth
phase in the European transition region - were identiﬁed. This led to 321 episodes. In the second
stage, all episodes from that group where average current account deﬁcits exceeded 4.2 per cent
of GDP (the average value for emerging Europe between 1995 and 2008, based on the regional
deﬁnition of “central and eastern Europe” in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database) were
selected. The resulting set contains 10 growth episodes with high current account deﬁcits for
emerging Europe after 1990 (with an average growth rate of 5.6 per cent and an average current
account deﬁcit of 7.6 per cent) against 39 episodes from other regions (see Table 1). Therefore,
growth episodes accompanied by large capital inﬂows do indeed seem much less frequent, in
relative terms, in the broad non-transition sample.
There are, however, a small number of growth episodes in history that indeed show a similar
pattern: Canada and Finland in the pre-World War I episode, Norway, Portugal, and Spain during
the 1920s, the post-World War II catch-up in western Europe, Latin America from the 1960s until
the 1980s’ debt crisis, and some countries from emerging Asia between the 1970s until the mid
1990s. When analysing what these episodes have in common with the current transition expe-
rience, one observes that most of these episodes involved some policy or regime change prior
to the episode (for example, post-war reorganisation, introduction of democracy, or renouncing
import substitution growth strategies). A possible interpretation of the observed association be-
tween high capital inﬂows and growth is that these changes increased the distance between the
actual and the steady state capital stocks either by making existing capital obsolete or by increas-
ing expected total factor productivity (TFP), and hence desired levels of per capita capital. In
such a situation, the growth beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration are particularly strong because the
transition between actual and desired capital stocks can be signiﬁcantly accelerated by capital
inﬂows (Hoxha, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vollrath, 2009).
In emerging Europe, ﬁnancial integration was preceded by some degree of capital obsolescence
and accompanied by strong advances in political integration - especially with the European
Union. This suggests a possible explanation of the stylised fact presented in Section 2. Once
it became clear that European transition countries would become part of the European Union or
a European Union-dominated Europe, there was a reasonable expectation that their institutions -
and, hence, TFP levels - would eventually converge to the European average, raising the expected
steady state. This may have created incentives for foreign investors and banks, particularly from
western Europe, to pursue long-term investment strategies in the region (even ahead of actual
institutional improvements). These would include the build-up of branches and subsidiaries with
a better knowledge of the ﬁnancial needs of local businesses and thus better opportunities to ﬁ-
nance growth-generating investments. In this way, ﬁnancial integration may have speeded up the
8Table 1: Sustained growth spells associated with large capital inﬂows
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G"DJ%@$Fc56&5F%#&F1J6"H:5>J@6FG@"HH#@6[HF!"#%#D"%$F16"H"HFT%:%Y%H@- 9transition process from the current to the expected steady state, which would have taken a much
longer time period if it had had to be ﬁnanced by domestic savings. On top of this, the “collateral
beneﬁts” of ﬁnancial integration (see Kose et al., 2009b; Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2010)
may even have led to higher steady state growth rates, for example by accelerating ﬁnancial deep-
ening. One goal of our empirical analysis is to check whether there is any empirical support for
the proposed explanation of the stylised fact.7
7Given our short sample period of seven years, we cannot distinguish between the transition to a higher steady
state and higher steady state growth rates in our empirical analysis.
104 Is emerging Europe different? Baseline speciﬁcation
4.1 Empirical model
Our analysis is based on industry-level data, applying the methodology developed in the seminal
paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to the context of ﬁnancial integration. The approach relies on
the following theoretical presumption: some industries depend on external ﬁnance - as opposed
to internal ﬁnance, such as retained earnings - more than others (for example, because they have
to make large investments that generate cash ﬂows only after several years). If ﬁnancial integra-
tion “works” in the sense that it facilitates access to ﬁnancing and thereby ultimately inﬂuences
investment and growth, it should have a larger effect on industries that depend strongly on ex-
ternal ﬁnancing. This implication can be tested by estimating an econometric model in which
the growth effect of ﬁnancial integration is allowed to vary according to the external ﬁnancial
dependence of an industry.





where j denotes the industry and k the country. One major advantage of this methodology is
that is controls for country (ak) and industry (bj) ﬁxed effects, which mitigates the endogeneity
problem. Furthermore, the industry share is included in order to account for the fact that young
industriesonaveragegrowfasterthanmatureindustry; hence, weexpectgtobenegative. Thetwo
interaction terms capture the effect of ﬁnancial integration on industry-level growth, depending
on external dependence of an industry. External dependence measures the degree to which ﬁrms
of industry j are dependent on external ﬁnance. In the ﬁrst interaction term, external dependence
is interacted with various measures of ﬁnancial integration at the country level. The second
interaction term is additionally interacted with an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1
when a country is part of emerging Europe. This term captures differences between European
transition economies and other developing countries regarding the effect of ﬁnancial integration
on industry-level growth.8
Hence, the main coefﬁcients of interest are d0 and d1. d0 captures the impact of ﬁnancial integra-
tion, depending on external dependence, in countries outside of emerging Europe. If industries
that rely strongly on external ﬁnancing beneﬁt more from ﬁnancial integration in this group of
countries, this coefﬁcient should be positive. d1 captures the differential effect of ﬁnancial inte-
gration in emerging Europe. A signiﬁcant coefﬁcient implies that the growth effects of ﬁnancial
8The original Rajan-Zingales paper studied the interaction effect between external dependence and ﬁnancial
development rather than ﬁnancial integration. We do not control for ﬁnancial development in this regression
(except to the extent that it is absorbed by the country dummy) because we are interested in the impact of ﬁnancial
integration on growth through all channels, including through ﬁnancial development.
11integration are different in European transition countries. The sum of d0 and d1 captures the to-
tal effect of ﬁnancial integration (again depending on external dependence) in emerging Europe.
Note that the overall effect of ﬁnancial integration cannot be identiﬁed because the level effect is
absorbed by the country ﬁxed effects; only the slope effect measuring the dependence on external
dependence is identiﬁed.
4.2 Data
Industry growth We use industry data from the Industrial Statistics Database provided by the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Since our focus is on the Euro-
pean transition region, we are using the UNIDO (Revision 3) dataset, which is the only version
covering transition economies to a large extent. This comes at the cost that other regions have
a lower coverage (see Appendix A.2 for details). We restrict our analysis to developing coun-
tries because we are interested in explaining the differences in the growth performance within
the group of developing countries rather than those between developing and industrialised coun-
tries. Starting from the maximum sample of developing countries for which industry data is
available, we follow Prasad et al. (2007) in eliminating a number of countries according to some
pre-deﬁned criteria to avoid a distortion of results. Speciﬁcally, we drop small island economies,
countries relying strongly on oil exports, and countries with substantial inﬂows of developmental
aid (see Appendix A.1 for details). This selection procedure leads us to a sample of 25 middle-
and low-income countries, twelve of which are from emerging Europe.
As a measure of industry growth, we calculate average growth rates of real output over the pe-
riod 1998 to 2005.9 This time period reﬂects the trade-off between choosing a long time span to
capture medium-term effects of ﬁnancial integration and smooth out business cycle effects, and
maintainingareasonablylargecross-sectionofcountries, includingabroadsetoftransitioncoun-
tries.10 Moreover, we exclude the boom in transition economies preceding the subprime crisis to
avoidbiasingourresultstowardsﬁndingpositivegrowtheffectsinthesecountries. Therefore, our
results should be considered a lower bound to the actual growth effects of ﬁnancial integration.11
Table 2shows the compositionof the sampleand some descriptivestatistics at thecountry level.12
The sample used in most of our regressions contains 992 observations. Note that the sample is
highly unbalanced as many countries do not provide any information on some sectors.
Industry share The industry share of an industry j in country k is computed as the ratio of the
size of this industry and the size of the entire manufacturing sector of the respective country in
1998.
9Note that the growth variable has been winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
10Long-run effects, especially those from FDI, are unlikely to materialise in such a short time period.
11It would be desirable to also explore the effect of ﬁnancial integration on TFP growth (as in Bonﬁglioli, 2008;
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2009a). Due to a lack of sufﬁcient data on investment in the given data set, such an
analysis in not feasible here.
12For overall descriptive statistics, see Table A.3 in the Appendix.
12Table 2: Country-level descriptive statistics
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External dependence The external dependence ratios of industries are taken from Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and are deﬁned as the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash ﬂow from opera-
tions, divided by capital expenditures. Hence, they measure the share of capital expenditures that
cannot be ﬁnanced internally in a given industry. Since observed external dependence ratios in
developing countries are distorted by ﬁnancial frictions, Rajan and Zingales suggested to use the
corresponding ratios of US industries, arguing that the US capital market comes closest to the
ideal of a frictionless market. The fact that these ratios were computed on the basis of data from
the 1980s comes in handy here, since the US industry structure at that time should better reﬂect
today’s industry structure in developing countries than a corresponding up-to-date ratio. It should
be noted that we had to adjust the industry deﬁnitions in our dataset to those used by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) (see Appendix A.2 for details).
Financial integration Regarding ﬁnancial integration, Kose et al. (2009b) argue in favour of
quantity-based, de facto measures. The early literature had used mostly de jure measures, such
as those based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions (AREAER). However, such measures do not fully capture the degree of enforcement and
effectiveness of capital controls as well as regulations in other ﬁelds that affect capital ﬂows.
Regarding the choice between quantity- and price based measures, Kose et al. point out that ob-
13served price differences may be due to risk and liquidity premia rather than being an indication of
low ﬁnancial integration. In addition, domestic ﬁnancial markets might not be liquid enough to
efﬁciently diminish price differentials, so that price-based measures may underestimate the true
degree of ﬁnancial integration. Therefore, quantity-based measures are also used in this study.
We use nine de facto, quantity-based measures of ﬁnancial integration. To ensure comparability
with Prasad et al. (2007) and Abiad et al. (2009), we use the current account deﬁcit in per cent
of GDP - taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database - as our ﬁrst variable (CA, see
Table 2 for the values of ﬁnancial integration measures of all included countries). Moreover, we
compute six measures from the External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database, which was con-
structed and updated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We use both stock and ﬂow variables.13
First, we use the standard measure of gross ﬁnancial integration, deﬁned as the sum of total for-
eign assets and total foreign liabilities in per cent of GDP (GFI). Gross measures of ﬁnancial
integration have the advantage that they also capture risk-sharing beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration.
Then we consider various measures taking into account only foreign liabilities (capturing only
the ﬁnancing side of ﬁnancial integration), distinguishing different types of foreign liabilities:
foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign debt (D), both expressed in per cent of GDP.14 In
addition, we consider the changes of these variables between 1998 and 2005: the change in FDI
liabilities (DFDI) and the change in foreign debt (DD). Further, we consider the change in net for-
eign assets (deﬁned as the difference between foreign assets and foreign liabilities) between 1998
and 2005 in per cent of GDP (DNFA), which serves as a valuation-change adjusted equivalent to
the current account. Lastly, we use two measures capturing the presence of foreign banks, which
is one distinguishing feature of ﬁnancial integration in the European transition region. First, we
use the share of assets held by foreign banks in total assets of the respective banking system
(Foreign bank asset share); second, we use the share of the number of foreign banks in all banks
(Foreign bank number share). Both variables are taken from Claessens, Van Horen, Gurcanlar,
and Sapiain (2008).15
It should be noted that the variable choice reﬂects our intention to mainly capture the beneﬁts
of ﬁnancial integration running through the ﬁnancing side, for example, the loosening of capital
constraints of local ﬁrms and the transfer of managerial skills from parent ﬁrms to local ﬁrms
through FDI transactions. To capture beneﬁts from risk-sharing, other variables may be more
appropriate. However, the ﬁnancing side is likely to be the most relevant transmission channel
in the European transition region. Nevertheless, the estimated values should be seen as a lower
bound for the gains from ﬁnancial integration because risk-sharing beneﬁts are not fully captured.
Note that the stock variables enter as averages over the sample period, that is, 1998 to 2005
(unless noted otherwise). The same time period is used when considering changes in ﬁnancial
integration. In order to minimise endogeneity problems, the use of starting values of the stock
variables would be preferable. However, in our case, the starting values do not reﬂect actual
differences in ﬁnancial integration in the considered time period because all ﬁnancial integration
measures increased sharply between 1998 and 2005 in the transition region.
13Strictly speaking, what we call “ﬂows” are valuation effect-adjusted changes in stocks over the sample period.
14We do not consider portfolio equity ﬂows because they are quantitatively insigniﬁcant in the transition region.
15“Foreign bank number shares” are measured as an average from 1998 to 2005, and “foreign bank asset shares”
as an average between 2000 and 2005 due to missing data.
144.3 Results
We now discuss the results from the baseline regression (1), shown in Table 3. The columns
show the regressions using different measures of ﬁnancial integration in the interaction terms.16
In all regressions, the industry share enters negatively as expected and is signiﬁcant at the 1 per
cent level (see ﬁrst line of the table, p-values are in parentheses). The next two lines in the table
report the coefﬁcients of the two interaction terms. The second line shows the coefﬁcients of the
Rajan-Zingales interaction term (corresponding to d0 in equation 1). It is to be interpreted as the
effect of ﬁnancial integration, depending on external dependence, for countries not belonging to
emerging Europe (called “other countries” in the table). If there were a sectoral growth effect for
this group of countries, this coefﬁcient should be signiﬁcantly negative for the ﬁrst two measures
of ﬁnancial integration (where a higher value indicates less ﬁnancial integration) and signiﬁcantly
positive for the remaining measures. In line with the existing literature, we ﬁnd no evidence of a
sectoral growth effect of ﬁnancial integration for these countries. The coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant
in all regressions, and it even has the “wrong” sign in some cases.
The third line shows the differential sectoral growth effect in European transition countries, rela-
tive to the effect of other developing countries (corresponding to d1 in equation 1). We ﬁnd that
this coefﬁcient goes in the expected direction in 8 out of 9 cases and is statistically signiﬁcant in
6 cases. Hence, there appear to be signiﬁcant differences between European transition countries
and other developing countries: industries in European transition economies beneﬁt more from
ﬁnancial integration than those in other developing countries. The total sectoral growth effect for
European transition countries can be seen in the fourth line, which is the sum of the coefﬁcients
from the second and third line (corresponding to d0+d1). We see that the total sectoral growth
effect shows the expected sign in 8 out of 9 cases and is signiﬁcant in all these cases at the 5 per
cent level. The exception are foreign debt ﬂows, which show the “wrong” sign and are insignif-
icant. Hence, a large change in foreign debt does not seem to be conducive to economic growth
(whereas a high level is beneﬁcial). This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that high debt ﬂows
often go along with credit booms and other types of vulnerabilities, which make a country more
prone to adverse shocks, and is well in line with the existing literature (see, for example, Kose
et al., 2009b).17
In order to get a sense of the economic signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients, we calculate differen-
tials in real growth rates, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998). That is, we consider two
industries at the 25th and 75th percentile of external dependence, and two countries at the 25th
and 75th percentile of the respective measure of ﬁnancial integration. Then we compare the dif-
ference between the sectoral growth rates of the two industries across the two countries. The
number of 1.55 in the ﬁfth line of the ﬁrst column then implies that an externally dependent in-
dustry grows by 1.55 percentage points faster than a hardly externally dependent industry if it
is based in a ﬁnancially integrated country rather than in a hardly ﬁnancially integrated coun-
try (holding constant industry shares). We hence see that the sectoral growth effect of ﬁnancial
16We use robust standard errors throughout. Clustering by country or sectors yields very similar results.
However, in a cross-sectional framework with ﬁxed effects in both dimensions, clustering does not seem to be
necessary. Moreover, the number of clusters is relatively small, which reduces the reliability of clustered standard
errors.
17Debt ﬂows also show a different pattern than other ﬁnancial integration measures in all following regressions.
15Table 3: Baseline regression results
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integration is substantial in European transition countries: it ranges between 0.72 and 1.92 per-
centage points. The sixth line ﬁnally displays the difference in the differentials in real growth
rates between European transition countries and other developing countries. We see that this
difference is substantial in economic terms. The value of 2.43 in the ﬁrst column, for example,
implies that the differential real growth rate (as calculated above) in emerging Europe exceeds
that in other developing countries by 2.43 percentage points.
Hence, there is strong evidence for European transition countries that industries depending on
external ﬁnancing grow relatively faster (compared with industries not depending on external
ﬁnancing) in ﬁnancially integrated countries than in less integrated countries. There exists no
such effect for developing countries outside of emerging Europe.
165 Why is emerging Europe different? Evidence from thresh-
old regressions
5.1 Empirical model
Given these strong results on the differences between the European transition region and other
developing countries, the question arises what drives these remarkable differences. Threshold
effects and other types of non-linearities have become popular explanations of the difﬁculty to
detect growth effects of ﬁnancial integration in broad country samples. One of the ﬁrst papers
to ﬁnd evidence of threshold effects is by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) who detect
threshold effects in human capital regarding the effect of FDI on economic growth. Brezigar-
Masten, Coricelli, and Masten (2008) examine whether ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial in-
tegration have non-linear effects on economic growth, using macroeconomic and industry-level
data for Europe. The authors conclude that the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration become signiﬁcant
at higher levels of ﬁnancial development. Kose et al. (2009c) examine various types of threshold
effects for ﬁnancial integration (for example, ﬁnancial development, institutional quality, regu-
lation, trade openness, macroeconomic policies) in a sample of 84 countries (21 industrial and
63 developing countries) over the period 1995-2004. The results indicate that thresholds exist,
but their level depends on the type of capital examined (i.e., thresholds are lower for FDI and
portfolio equity ﬂows). Abiad et al. (2009) provide evidence that part of the observed difference
between Europe and other countries can be explained by threshold effects in institutional qual-
ity and ﬁnancial integration itself. However, Imbs (2009) stresses in a comment on that paper
that a signiﬁcant part of the European effect remains unexplained, even after including threshold
effects.
However, since most of these studies include both developing and developed countries, their re-
sultsmaybedrivenbythedifferencebetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountries, andnotbydif-
ferences within the group of developing countries. We therefore test for threshold effects within
our sample of developing countries, using the same sectoral analysis as above (Section 4.1). We
check for threshold effects in several dimensions: ﬁnancial development (as suggested by Prasad
et al., 2007), institutional quality and ﬁnancial integration itself (as suggested by Abiad et al.,
2009), and in addition also trade integration, the second pillar of the “development model” in the
European transition region.
In order to test for the presence of threshold effects, we add another interaction term to the
baseline model, which multiplies the original interaction term with a threshold dummy variable
indicating whether some other variable (measuring ﬁnancial development, institutional quality,





+d2(ext:dependencej fin:integrationk)threshold dummyk+ej;k; (2)
Our estimation strategy is to see whether the interaction term with the emerging Europe dummy
remains signiﬁcant, once we introduce threshold effects. If not, threshold effects are able to
explain the difference between European transition countries and other developing countries. If
yes, there must be something else that explains the observed differences.
5.2 Threshold variables
The threshold dummy variables are equal to one if the respective threshold variable (ﬁnancial
development, institutional quality, trade integration, or ﬁnancial integration itself) is above the
sample mean of countries, and zero otherwise. Financial development is measured by private
domestic credit over GDP and is taken from Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). Insti-
tutional quality is measured by the variable “Regulatory quality” provided by the World Bank
(Worldwide Governance Indicators). The variable refers to the year 1998. Trade integration vari-
able is measured by an “adjusted trade intensity” according to Pritchett (1996). It is created by
taking the residuals from a regression of openness on the log of population, size, remoteness,
income per capita (as well as its square) and indicator variables for oil exports and landlocked-
ness of a country. Estimation takes place in a panel framework, but the variable is created from
the resulting 1998 value. The cutoff values of these threshold dummies, as well as the values
for individual countries are displayed in Table 4. Financial integration is measured by the same
variables as above. See Table 2 for cutoff levels.
5.3 Results
The ﬁrst set of regressions (Table 5) considers threshold effects in ﬁnancial development (private
credit/GDP). The idea is that ﬁnancial integration may be more beneﬁcial if the ﬁnancial system
of the developing country is sophisticated enough to efﬁciently absorb foreign funds. Let us ﬁrst
explain the interpretation of the coefﬁcients in the threshold regressions. The coefﬁcients in the
second line (corresponding to d0 in equation 2) now denote the sectoral growth effect for coun-
tries that are neither in the transition region, nor above the median of ﬁnancial development. The
coefﬁcient in the third line (corresponding to d1) has a similar interpretation as before: it denotes
the differential sectoral growth effect in European transition countries relative to other developing
countries (holding constant ﬁnancial development). Lastly, the coefﬁcient in the fourth line (cor-
responding to d2) gives the differential sectoral growth effect in countries above the median of
18Table 4: Threshold variables
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ﬁnancial development relative to those below the median (independently of whether the country
is in the European transition region or not).
We ﬁnd only weak evidence of threshold effects in ﬁnancial development. The coefﬁcient of
the threshold interaction (fourth line) is mostly insigniﬁcant (apart from the coefﬁcient on debt
ﬂows, which again has the “wrong” sign, and the two FDI measures which are signiﬁcant at
the 10 per cent level). Hence, threshold effects can be found only with respect to foreign direct
investment. Most importantly, the emerging Europe interaction term remains signiﬁcant in all
cases, compared with the baseline regression.18 Moreover, the difference in the differential in
real growth rates between emerging Europe and other developing countries actually increases
in most instances (on average, it increases by about one third).19 Hence, threshold effects in
ﬁnancial development cannot explain why emerging Europe appears to be different.
Theresultsare similarintheregressionsincluding athresholddummyinteraction forinstitutional
quality (see Table 6). Here the threshold interaction never has a signiﬁcant effect on economic
growth, and the emerging Europe interaction term again stays signiﬁcant in all cases. The differ-
18It also turns signiﬁcant for debt ﬂows, but again in the opposite direction.
19As an alternative, we measured ﬁnancial development by stock market capitalisation. These regressions yield
the same results: there is little evidence of threshold effects, and the emerging Europe interaction term remains
signiﬁcant.
19Table 5: Evidence on threshold effects - ﬁnancial development
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threshold effects in institutional quality cannot explain either why the European transition region
is different.20
The third threshold speciﬁcations focus on trade integration. The results are again similar to the
previous threshold speciﬁcations (see Table 7). The interaction term with the threshold variable is
insigniﬁcant in all cases. In line with the speciﬁcations for ﬁnancial development and institutional
quality, the emerging Europe interaction term remains signiﬁcant in all cases. The difference in
the differential in real growth rates between emerging Europe and other developing countries is
slightly below that in the baseline speciﬁcation. Hence, these results imply that threshold effects
in trade integration cannot be an explanation for the observed difference either.
The ﬁnal threshold speciﬁcation focuses on ﬁnancial integration itself. We ran regressions for
all of our ﬁnancial integration measures. For most measures, the results are virtually identical to
the preceding threshold speciﬁcations. Some noteworthy results are, however, obtained for the
ﬁnancial integration measures related to multinational banking. Table 8 presents the results for
the regressions using foreign bank asset share as interaction variable; Table A.4 in the Appendix
displays the results for the regressions using foreign bank number shares.21
While there is again no evidence of threshold effects, the coefﬁcient of the emerging Europe
interaction term now becomes smaller (in absolute value) in all regressions and is insigniﬁcant
in all but two regressions (see Table 8). The difference between emerging Europe and other
20Again, we also tried an alternative measure of institutional quality, namely “rule of law.” The results are
unchanged.
21From a conceptual point of view, the ﬁrst variable is preferred. However, the second may be subject to less
measurement error.
20Table 6: Evidence on threshold effects - institutional quality
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developing countries in terms of the differential in real growth rates decreases markedly (by
about one fourth on average). Results are similar when using the foreign bank number share
as threshold variable, though the reduction in the coefﬁcients and in differential growth rates is
somewhat smaller. These results are remarkable. They suggest that the presence of foreign banks
in the region may be related to the question of why emerging Europe appears to be different. But
even here, the unexplained part of the difference remains substantial.22
The large unexplained difference even remains when we include all four threshold interactions
(ﬁnancial development, institutional quality, trade integration and ﬁnancial integration, measured
either by foreign bank asset or number share) at the same time (see Tables 9 and A.3). In fact,
the difference between emerging Europe and other developing countries even increases in some
regressions, compared with the baseline regression.
As a further robustness check, we repeated all regressions using different thresholds, such as the
25th and 75th percentiles. For all threshold variables, the main result is robust: the emerging
Europe interaction term remains statistically signiﬁcant in most cases. In addition, we re-ran all
regressions using continuous interactions terms instead of threshold dummies. Hence, the thresh-
old dummy in equation 2 would be replaced, for example, by ﬁnancial development itself. Again,
the emerging Europe interaction term remains signiﬁcant in most cases, even in the regressions
using foreign bank asset or number shares as interaction variables. Taken together, these re-
sults imply that none of the considered factors can satisfactorily explain the differences between
emerging Europe and other developing countries. As a ﬁnal step, we therefore analyse whether
political integration may explain why ﬁnancial integration appears to work better in European
transition countries than elsewhere.
22These results are broadly in line with the country-level results by Abiad et al. (2009).
21Table 7: Evidence on threshold effects - trade integration





&-7523)8.240)* 9:;<=> 9:;<:> 9:;<?@ 9:;<:> 9:;<=: 9:;<<: 9:;<=A 9:;<?A 9:;<=B
C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D C:;:?D
:;BEA 9:;?<A 9?;=>@ ?;?@F 9:;::? 9:;?B> 9:;:B< :;::> 9:;:=B
C:;==D C:;@ED C:;=BD C:;:BD C:;>FD C:;<AD C:;BAD C:;>=D C:;F<D
9:;@@> 9:;><E ?;:E@ 9?;=F> :;:<> :;?B? :;?:= :;:AA :;:@<
C:;:ED C:;=D C:;:ED C:;:AD C:;:?D C:;:<D C:;:?D C:;<AD C:;?D
9:;B@: 9:;:@> ?;BA: 9:;@>< :;:?F :;??@ :;:AF :;:<? :;:B@
C:;=BD C:;>D C:;?BD C:;?<D C:;<<D C:;=<D C:;?BD C:;B<D C:;=ED
!"#$%&#+G*)*-H*.+-.7+G*)*-I0J.+-.)*0J.,)(K34.)03*2 ?;>@ ?;B= ?;:B 9?;>@ :;>: :;F< ?;E: :;>? ?;:>
L/2*)M0I(-2 >>= >>= >>= >>= >>= >>= >>= >>= >>=














6 Why is emerging Europe different? The role of political in-
tegration
6.1 Empirical model
The analysis of ﬁnancial, institutional and trade threshold effects has shown that the difference
between European transition countries and other countries is not easily explained. Only ﬁnancial
integration in the form of multinational banking manages to explain at least part of the difference.
Therefore, we now turn to the third pillar of the development model in the European transition
region, political integration. The interactions between ﬁnancial and political integration have
hardly been analysed in the literature.23 For European transition countries, the degree of politi-
cal integration with the European Union is certainly one of the most important determinants of
economic and political conditions.
Political integration may affect economic growth in several ways. First, it may increase political
stability. This can even happen when several developing countries in the same region conclude
a regional integration agreement. The effect will be even stronger if the regional integration
agreement includes developed countries. Second, there may be positive institutional spillover
effects among politically integrated countries. This effect will again be strongest if developing
countries join a regional integration agreement with highly developed countries, as is the case in
the European Union. Here one would expect an “export” of institutions from the country with
23Campos and Coricelli (2009) analyse the relationship between democratisation and ﬁnancial reforms.
22Table 8: Evidence on threshold effects - ﬁnancial integration (foreign bank asset share)
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more developed institutions to the developing country.24 Such effects may result in an (expected)
increase in total factor productivity (TFP). The expectation of improvements in political stability
and institutional quality inﬂuences foreign investors’ behaviour. If, for example, political integra-
tion raises expectations of future reforms and of a ﬁrm commitment to sound economic policy,
investors may be willing to pursue potentially growth-enhancing investment strategies that oth-
erwise would not be proﬁtable, or excessively risky. For example, they may be willing to enter
long-term commitments. The creation of branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in eastern
Europe is a good example. Such investments may speed up the transition to a higher steady
state, or even increase steady state growth rates, for example, through ﬁnancial deepening. Given
these arguments, we would expect the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration to be largest when it is
accompanied by political integration.
To analyse the role of political integration, we start from the basic speciﬁcation and add another
interaction term:
Growthj;k = ak+bj+gindustry sharej;k
+d0(ext:dependencej fin:integrationk)
+d1(ext:dependencej fin:integrationk)Emerg:Europe dummyk
+d2(ext:dependencej fin:integrationk) political integrationk+ej;k;
(3)
The estimation strategy is the same as in the section on threshold effects (Section 5). The critical
24However, we have even seen such spillover effects among developed countries in the European Union.
Consider, for example, the effects of European Union competition policy on countries like Germany.
23Table 9: Regression results when all interaction effects are included jointly
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question is how to deﬁne political integration.
6.2 Political integration index
In the literature, there are several approaches to measure political integration. Beckﬁeld (2006)
measures political integration as the number of cases referred from national courts to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Lee and Barro (2006) measure political proximity by the extent to which
two states have common foreign policy interests. The latter are proxied by the voting correla-
tions in the UN General Assembly. Dreher (2006) and Dreher and Martens (2008) construct
the KOF-Index of Globalisation, which contains a political dimension that comprises the num-
ber of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organisations
to which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions a country participated in,
and the number of treaties signed between two or more states since 1945. All these measures
capture only very speciﬁc aspects of political integration. We therefore construct a broad index
of political integration (see Appendix A.3 for an in-depth description of the construction of the
index).
We follow the work by Nye (1968), which theoretically identiﬁes four dimensions of the polit-
24Table 10: Political integration index
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ical integration process: an institutional dimension, a policy dimension, an attitude dimension
(subdivided in attitudes of the government and the public) and a stability dimension. We then
operationalise each of these dimensions by creating a corresponding subindex that takes on a
value between 0 and 10. Lastly, we combine all subindices into a composite index - also ranging
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 denotes the highest level of political integration. For each of
our sample countries, we identify the regional integration agreement that we consider the most
important one. A full list is displayed in Table 10.
The dimensions are operationalised as follows: the institutional dimension is supposed to capture
the degree of supranationality of each regional integration agreement. We approximate it by
setting the corresponding organisational budgets in relation to the number of member countries
in the respective regional integration agreement. The policy dimension is supposed to measure
the variety and extent of policy coordination that a regional integration agreement implies. It
consists of ﬁve subcomponents that evaluate different types of policies (that is, security policy,
trade policy, monetary policy, free movement of people, further integration intentions). The
attitude dimension is split in two parts. First, to measure the conformity of government views
across countries, we examine the correlation of voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly
between each country and a corresponding base country over the period 1998 to 2005 (cf. Lee
and Barro, 2006). Second, to capture the attitude of the public towards a regional integration
agreement, we use a set of questions from the World Values Survey concerning conﬁdence in
25the local regional integration agreement.25 Lastly, the stability dimension is supposed to proxy
for the stability of the political integration agreement in the future, based on the current and past
political stability in a country. Here, we use the Political Stability and Absence of Violence index
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank.
By assigning a weighting scheme of 30 per cent, 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent, we
then combine the four subindices to a composite index of political integration (see appendix).
The resulting index values for all sample countries are shown in Table 10. As expected, countries
from emerging Europe obtain high scores of political integration (see last column of Table 10).
However, we also observe some variation within this group of countries. For example, Romania
receives a score of 7.7, compared with a score of 9.1 for the Slovak Republic, even though both
countries are European Union members. It is also interesting to see that a country like (South)
Korea obtains a very low value of political integration. Even though Korea is a relatively open
country, it is not strongly politically integrated in the region. It is not even a regular member of
ASEAN, but only serves as a dialogue country.
We refrain from estimating threshold effects of political integration because a threshold dummy
here would be almost indistinguishable from the emerging Europe dummy. Therefore, it is almost
tautological that the emerging Europe interaction becomes insigniﬁcant if a threshold dummy
of political integration is introduced. By using the index as a continuous variable instead of a
threshold variable, more information is provided that may help distinguish between the regional
dummy and the index of political integration.
6.3 Results
The results are revealing (see Table 11). For the ﬁrst time, all coefﬁcients of the emerging Eu-
rope interaction term become insigniﬁcant and their p-values take on much higher values than
before. Hence, there are no longer signiﬁcant differences between the growth effects of ﬁnancial
integration in emerging Europe and other developing countries once we control for an interac-
tion with political integration. However, the interaction terms with political integration are also
statistically insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings can be explained by the high correlation between the
emerging Europe dummy variable and the political integration index (the correlation coefﬁcient
is 0.92). Indeed, the two interaction terms are jointly signiﬁcant in most cases. Hence, this
approach is not able to disentangle the effects of the two variables due to the high correlation
between them.
To circumvent this multicollinearity problem, we present an alternative speciﬁcation where we
restrict the sample to the transition region only. Thus, we focus on the variation in the political
integration index within the transition region. In this speciﬁcation, we no longer include a re-
gional interaction term (that is, d1 does not exist here), as the sample corresponds almost exactly
to the emerging Europe region used to deﬁne the regional dummy. The difference consists of
only three countries (Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia), which belong to the transition sample,
25Data from this survey was also used by Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2008) who analyse the effect of
social capital on the degree of ﬁnancial integration of regions within the European Union.
26Table 11: Regressions including interaction term with political integration - World sample
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but not to emerging Europe.
The results from the second approach, based on a sample of 15 countries from the transition re-
gion, are presented in Table 12. Most strikingly, the interaction term with the political integration
index has the expected sign in all but one regression (again debt ﬂows) and is mostly signiﬁcant
at the 5 per cent level. Two of the three cases where the interaction term is not signiﬁcant are in
regressions using foreign bank presence as a measure of ﬁnancial integration. This is presumably
due to the fact that the variation of foreign bank presence within the group of transition countries
is relatively small; thus, it may be difﬁcult to estimate its effect precisely in a sample that is
restricted to transition countries.
The effect of political integration is also economically important. Raising the political integra-
tion index from the level of Albania (5.3) to that of Poland (8.3) increases the differential in real
growth rates by between 0.39 and 1.92 percentage points. Changing the index from the low-
est value (Korea, 2.1) to the highest (Slovak Republic, 9.1) would amount to a change in the
differential in real growth rates of up to 4.48 percentage points. This is a substantial effect.
Takentogether, theseresultssuggestthatpoliticalintegrationmayplayacrucialroleinexplaining
why emerging Europe was different in the considered time period. In the European transition
region, ﬁnancial integration was accompanied by political integration with the European Union,
which may have provided an anchor for relatively stable economic and political prospects. This
in turn may have inﬂuenced the way foreign investors employed their capital in the region. The
strong presence of foreign banks in European transition countries could itself be a consequence
of political integration. This explanation would rationalise the lack of statistical signiﬁcance of
the emerging Europe interaction term in the threshold regressions for ﬁnancial integration when
the latter was measured by foreign bank presence. Overall, these results indicate that the beneﬁts
27Table 12: Regressions including interaction term with political integration - transition
country sample
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a country can reap from ﬁnancial integration are much larger if it is accompanied by political
integration.
287 Conclusion
Using the methodology by Rajan and Zingales (1998) based on industry-level data from a sample
of low and middle income countries, we have shown that the European transition region beneﬁted
muchmorestronglyfromﬁnancialintegrationintermsofeconomicgrowththanotherdeveloping
countriessincethelate1990s. Theeffectofﬁnancialintegrationongrowthisnotonlystatistically
signiﬁcant, but also economically important. Hence, the experience of emerging Europe seems
to conform to neoclassical growth theory, which predicts that openness to foreign capital should
allow countries to grow faster towards their steady state income levels.
The difference between the effect of ﬁnancial integration in emerging Europe and elsewhere in
our sample period cannot be explained by threshold effects in ﬁnancial development, institutional
quality, and trade integration. There is no evidence of such threshold effects in our sample, and
the emerging Europe interaction term remains signiﬁcant in these regressions. However, there is
substantial evidence that the ﬁnding can be explained by the region’s high level of political inte-
gration with the European Union. Within the group of transition countries, the effect of ﬁnancial
integration was found to be strongest for countries that are most highly politically integrated with
the European Union. This suggests that political and ﬁnancial integration are complementary and
that political integration can considerably increase the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration. A pos-
sible explanation of our ﬁndings is that the process of political integration with Europe created
expectations of a stable political and economic environment in the European transition countries
and of the eventual catch-up of their institutions with those of western European countries. This
in turn made it proﬁtable for foreign investors to engage in projects that would otherwise have
been considered too risky, with beneﬁcial effects on economic growth.
We also found some evidence that threshold effects in ﬁnancial integration in the form of foreign
bank presence help explain why ﬁnancial integration “worked” in the transition region. In the
respective threshold speciﬁcation, the emerging Europe interaction term became insigniﬁcant in
most regressions. There are two interpretations of this result. First, a high degree of foreign
bank presence may simply be picking up the political integration effect that we ﬁnd separately.
Second, European parent banks may have provided their subsidiaries in the transition region with
resources and knowledge, with beneﬁcial effects on ﬁnancial systems at large. This may have
allowed for a more efﬁcient allocation of foreign capital.
Our results have important policy implications. They suggest that the negative side effects
of ﬁnancial integration that became evident in the current crisis, such as credit booms, over-
indebtedness of ﬁrms and households, and especially a high exposure to foreign currency debt,
must be weighed carefully against clear evidence that ﬁnancial integration has had signiﬁcant
growth effects in the transition region. This does not imply that the risks associated with ﬁnan-
cial integration do not need to be taken seriously, but it does suggest that policy should seek
various ways to better manage those risks, rather than push back against ﬁnancial integration per
se (see also European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009, 2010).
Furthermore, our results suggest that ﬁnancial integration works best when accompanied by a
process of political integration with more advanced countries. In fact, the same forces stimulating
29growth in the presence of political integration may also lower costs in times of crisis. Indeed,
there is evidence of a protective role of foreign banks in the current crisis (see Bergl¨ of et al., 2009;
Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2010).26 Emerging Europe provides the most prominent example of
suchapoliticalintegrationprocess, andinthisrespect, itisindeeddifferentfromotherdeveloping
countries. But, in the medium term, the European model might also be replicable elsewhere.
26See also De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) on internal capital markets of multinational banks.
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Starting with all countries contained in the UNIDO (Revision 3) database, the sample is narrowed
downbyexcludingthosecountriesthatsatisfyoneofthefollowingfourcriteria(similarto Prasad
et al., 2007).
1. To obtain a homogenous sample of middle and low income countries, we exclude countries
where the average purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita over the period 1994-2008
is more than US-$ 20,000. In addition, we also exclude Portugal from the sample, which
nowadays is considered a high income country, but would not be eliminated by this selec-
tion criterion.
2. We exclude small open island economies (which typically have extremely high ﬁnancial
integration measures) if they are smaller than 30,000 sq. km.
3. We eliminate countries with an average value of oil exports over GDP of more than 10 per
cent to avoid the problem that potential growth effects in highly ﬁnancially integrated coun-
tries are overshadowed by windfall proﬁts and corresponding current account surpluses in
commodity exporting countries.
4. Lastly, we drop countries that on average received development aid of more than 15 per
cent of GDP over the period 1994 to 2008 to focus on the growth effects of private capital
ﬂows.
A.2 Sectoral data
Output growth We use industry output data from the 3rd revision of the Industrial Statis-
tics Database with 4-digit level International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic
Activities (ISIC codes) provided by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO). To calculate real output growth, we deﬂate output in current prices in national curren-
cies, using national GDP deﬂators from the International Financial Statistics database.
Sector deﬁnitions Since the industry-level data from Rajan and Zingales (1998) consists of a
mixture of 3-digit and 4-digit level ISIC codes that are consistent with UNIDO data from the 2nd
revision, they differ from the 4-digit level classiﬁcation that is applied in the 3rd revision, which
we are using. While external dependence ratios exist for 36 industries in their sample (of which
27 are at the 3-digit level and 9 are at the 4-digit level), our dataset contains 127 industries at the
4-digit level. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward conversion method to convert industries
from the 2nd to the 3rd revision or vice versa, since some of the industry deﬁnitions mutually
contain each other. However, a correspondence table for converting industries from the 3rd to
34the 2nd revision is provided by the United Nations Statistics Division. Based on this table, we
proceed in the following way.
 All external dependence ratios with a 4-digit level ISIC code from the 2nd revision, can
easily be matched with the corresponding industries in the 3rd revision.
 For all other sectors, we use the 3rd digit of the 4-digit level ISIC code in the 3rd revision
(which unfortunately is still more detailed than the 3rd digit of the 3-digit ISIC code in
the 2nd revision) and match it with the external dependence ratio of the suggested industry
according to the correspondence table or, in case of more than one corresponding industry,
the industry that is obviously dominating.
 However, in the case of 7 sectors, where each industry from the 3rd revision is correspond-
ing to a greater number of industries from the 2nd revision and none of them is obviously
dominating, we use the average of these industries’ external dependence ratios.
 Lastly, in three cases, where an external dependence ratio of a sub-industry in the 3rd
revision data is available, we redeﬁne the top-level industry by excluding this separately
listed industry from the deﬁnition to avoid inconsistencies.
A.3 Political integration index
Our index of political integration is based on the work by Nye (1968) who suggests several
dimensions of political integration: an institutional dimension, policy dimension, attitude dimen-
sion (split into government and public opinion), and a stability dimension.
In each geographical region, we focus on the regional integration agreement that we consider the
most important one, or the one that delivers the highest degree of political integration: European
Union (EU) for all transition countries; Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) / South-
ern Common Market (MERCOSUR) for South America; Central American Integration System
(SICA) for Central American countries; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for
Asian countries; African Union (AU) for African countries; League of Arab States (Arab League)
for countries in the Middle East.
For each dimension of political integration, a subindex is constructed that ranges from 0 to 10,
where a value of 10 denotes the highest level of political integration. By assigning a weight to
each subindex, we construct the composite index of political integration. Nye (1968) does not
suggest any weighting scheme. We decided to give the highest weight to the institutional and
the policy dimensions (30 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively), and somewhat smaller weights
to the softer factors as attitude (20 per cent) and political stability (10 per cent). The results are
not sensitive to this choice.27 In the following, the construction of each subindex is described in
detail.
27Regressions using an index constructed on the basis of equal weights yield virtually the same results.
35Institutional dimension (30 per cent) We capture the degree of supranationality of each re-
gional integration agreement by setting the organisational budgets in relation to the number of
member countries in the respective regional integration agreement. We collect annual budget ﬁg-
ures of all regional integration agreements from various sources for the year 2010. The primary
source is the Yearbook of International Organizations 2010/11, as it provides comparable and
up-to-date US dollar ﬁgures. We complement these numbers by considering web pages, annual
reports, press statements, and newspaper articles.
EU candidate, aspirant, and Eastern Partnership countries in the transition region clearly tend
towards the European Union, but are no ofﬁcial members yet, and thus do not contribute to the
budget. To reﬂect expectations about future European Union membership, we assigned a share
of the European Union budget to each of them: 25 per cent for candidate countries, 10 per
cent for aspirant countries, and 1 per cent for Eastern Partnership countries. These numbers are
rather conservatively chosen. Similarly, Korea - who is not a full member state of ASEAN, but a
dialogue partner - is assigned a 75 per cent share of the ASEAN budget ﬁgure. In the next step,
the corresponding budget ﬁgures are divided by the number of member states listed in the CIA
World Factbook (excluding associated countries and observer countries). The resulting numbers
range from around US-$ 467,000 in the case of UNASUR/MERCOSUR to US-$ 7.2 billion in the
case of the European Union. These numbers are translated into our index scale in the following
way. All European Union countries receive a value of 10. As the distance to all other agreements
is enormous (the ratio between the European Union budget per member state and the second
highest budget per member state, that from the African Union, is 1539!), all other agreements
are assigned a value of 1. EU aspirant countries are assigned a value of 2, candidate countries a
value of 3.
Policy dimension (40 per cent) The policy dimension is comprised of ﬁve subcomponents
that take on values between 0 and 2, and thus also add up to an index between 0 and 10 (see
Table A.4). The subcomponents are the following.
1. Foreign/security policy coordination: Formal foreign/security policy agreement: 2 (for
example, “European Foreign and Defence Policy”/NATO members), Less formal agree-
ments: 1 (for example, “Partnership for Peace” members), No agreement: 0 (for example,
Panama).
2. Trade policy coordination: Custom Union: 2 (for example, EU Common Market); Re-
gionalTradeAgreement: 1(forexample, Rep. Korea: FreeTradeAgreementwithASEAN);
No Regional Trade Agreement: 0 (-); source: WTO Regional Trade Agreements gateway.
3. Monetary/currencypolicycoordination: CurrencyUnion: 2(forexample, Euro-member
countries); Moderate policy coordination: 1 (for example, EWS II member countries); No
policy coordination: 0 (for example, Brazil).
4. Movement of people Free movement to base country: 2 (for example, Schengen coun-
tries); no visa for travel to neighbour/base country required and no visa in return: 1 (for
36example, Brazil; base country: Argentina); no free movement/visa required: 0 (for ex-
ample, Armenia; base country: Germany); for base country deﬁnitions, see attitudes -
government; source: http://projectvisa.com.
5. More integration intended? Plans to intensify integration: 2 (for example, UNASUR
- “to model a community after the European Union which will include a common cur-
rency, parliament, passport, and defense policy”); integration as a goal: 1 (for example,
African Union - “to accelerate political, social, and economic integration”); no intention of
integration: 0 (League of Arab States - “promote economic, social, political, and military
cooperation”); sources: CIA World Factbook and subjective assessment.
Attitude dimension - Government (10 per cent) To measure the conformity of government
views across countries, we examine the correlation of voting behaviour in the UN General As-
sembly (source: Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, “United Nations General Assembly Voting
Data”) between each country and a corresponding base country over the period 1998 to 2005
(the results are not sensitive to this selection). We use the following base country concept. In a
ﬁrst step, we usually take the country with the highest US dollar GDP in each regional integra-
tion agreement in 2005 as a base country. In case the largest country is included in the sample
itself, we use the second largest country as a corresponding base country. The only exception is
the African Union as the distance between the countries and their corresponding base countries is
too large to assume that a high degree of political integration occurs. Here we use South Africa as
a base country for Botswana and Madagascar, and Botswana as a base country for South Africa.
We also conduct a number of robustness checks in which we look at the second or even third
largest country of the region, but in all cases the correlations are very close. To ﬁt the percentage
numbers to our 1 to 10 scale, we multiply each correlation by 10. In case of negative correlations,
a value of 0 is assigned.
Attitude dimension - Public opinion (10 per cent) To capture the attitude of the public to-
wards a regional integration agreement, we use data from the World Values Survey. We use the
two latest waves (1995/1998 and 1999/2000), which are available for a broad list of countries.
We focus on the question in the “politics and society” section that asks for the “conﬁdence” in the
local regional integration agreements. Questions are posed with respect to the following agree-
ments: European Union, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, African Union, and the League of Arab States.
Thirteen sample countries have been surveyed in both waves, and thus we take the average. Seven
countries in the sample were surveyed only once, so we include the available result. Five coun-
try/regional integration agreement pairs are not included in the survey. In the case of Botswana
and Madagascar, we take the value of South Africa with respect to the African Union. For Korea
and Uruguay, we use the conﬁdence in the United Nations by each of the countries as a proxy.
For Panama where this question is not available either, we use the survey result for Puerto Rico
with respect to the conﬁdence in the NAFTA as a proxy.
The answer options in all surveys comprise “A great deal,” “Quite a lot,” “Not very much,” and
“None at all,” and answers for each category are reported in per cent. The index value of this
subcategory is then constructed as follows: we multiply the given percentage values by 10, 5, -5,
37and -10, and add 5. This would imply for a country with equally distributed answers (that is, 50
per cent would be have conﬁdence in the agreement and 50 per cent not) to receive a score of 5.
The value of Albania, which obtains a score of 10.6, is adjusted to the maximum value of 10.
Political stability dimension (10 per cent) Nye (1968) recommended using the number of
hostileincidentsoveraspeciﬁedperiod. Wedonotﬁndthisconceptappropriate, thereforeweuse
instead the Political Stability and Absence of Violence index from the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) for the years 1998 to 2005. For each country, we compute an
average value of the Political Stability and Absence of Violence index over this period. The
original index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and thus has to be multiplied by 2 and augmented by 5 to
ﬁt into the 0 to 10 scale of our index.
A.4 Appendix charts and tables








Table A.1: Sector-level descriptive statistics
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39Table A.2: Evidence on threshold effects - ﬁnancial integration (foreign bank number
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40Table A.3: Regression results when all interaction effects are included jointly, using foreign
bank number share
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41Table A.4: Political integration index subscores
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